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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

C. EUGENE LARSON, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellants,
VS

ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICE
COMPANY, INC., a corporation,
and NORTHWEST ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION, a corporation,
HUGH GARDNER, DONALD H. WAGSTAFF,
JR., UNIVERSAL DIAMOND REO SALES
AND SERVICE and UNIVERSAL
DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC.,

Case No. 14815

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by the plaintiff,

c.

Eugene Larsen,

Sr. from the Judgment entered on the 19th day of July, 1976, by
the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The statement of the disposition in the lower Court
by Appellant is inaccurate.

The Court below ruled in favor of

the defendants holding that an execution sale conducted in another
case,which execution sale was the basis upon which the plaintiff
maintained his action in this matter, was invalid because it did
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not comply with law.

Defendants Associates Financial Service

and Northwest Accpetance are not a party to this appeal.
Defendant Wagstaff, not having been served with process, is
likewise not a party to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant, in his brief, has stated, generally, the
facts of the case.

However, except is taken as is noted below.

At the time of the purported constable's sale of the
reserves on the 10th day of April, 1974, in the matter entitled
Larsen v. Universal Diamond Reo Sales & Service (reference to
transcript of record for documents filed therein are denoted
R2-~_>

civil No. 205417, the constable was served by the

defendant with a "Notice of

~ack

of Jurisdiction of Constable to

Conduct Sale", which Notice was duly handed to the constable
prior to the sale.

(R2-12)

Appellant, in his Statement of Facts, alleges that
"subsequent to said execution sale, Universal Diamond Reo Sales

& Service •

made an assignment of its interest in and to the

above-described reserves . . . ".

This is inaccurate.

The assign-

ment in question was dated the 21st day of February, 1974, some
two months prior to the date of the sheriff's sale held on April
10, 1974, which assignment was duly served upon the Northwest
Acceptance Corporation on or about February 22, 1974.

(R 54-167)

At the time of trial, the plaintiff-appellant totally
failed to introduce any evidence whatsoever or elicit any testimony
with respect to his allegations of fraud on any creditor or that
there was no consideration for the assignment between Universal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Diamond Reo and the defendants Wagstaff and Gardner.

(R 157, line

18, Findings of Fact Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25)

The appellant

in fact elicited no testimony whatsoever during the trial but merely
introduced five exhibits and rested his case.

Whereupon, defendants

moved to dismiss the allegations of the complaint based on fraud,
wrongful transfer, wrongful dissipation of assets and other matters
contained in the complaint.

(R 157-158)

After the plaintiff had rested his case and defendants'
motion to dismiss had been submitted to the Court, the appellant
attempted to supplement his record by attaching to his Memorandum of
Authorities filed with the Court on August 6, 1976, various documents
upon which he now relies as being a part of the record.
The appellant, in his brief, sets forth in part the
Conclusions of Law made by the Court.

However, he omits from his

brief other conclusions such as is found in Conclusion of Law No.
3.

Conclusion of Law No. 8 wherein the Court found that as a

matter of law, the plaintiff failed to meet its burden to show
that the assignment in question to the respondents Wagstaff and
Gardner was in fraud of creditors or of the plaintiff or void for
want of consideration, or of Conclusions of Law Nos. 9, 10 and 11
thereof relating to the failure of plaintiff to put on any
evidence whatsoever with respect to the allegations of his complaint.
It is also to be noted that with respect to the defendants,
Associates Financial Service and Northwest Acceptance Corporation's
stipulation with the plaintiff, that the same was objected to by
the respondents and the record shows that they objected to being
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

bound by the same and to the content thereof.

{R 151, 152)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EXECUTION SALE CONDUCTED IN CASE NO. 205417 WAS VOID
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Appellant in his brief correctly states the content of
Rule 69{b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

One of the issues is

whether or not a constable has the right to conduct a judicial sale.
Respondent thinks that it is immaterial whether it is a deputy
constable or the constable himself who conducts the sale. It is
conceded that the sheriff and constable may operate and function
through the use of deputies.
A constable derives his rights and duties strictly by
statutory authority and this statutory authority has as its basis
17-25-1 UCA 1953.

In the case of Rich v. Industrial Commission,

80 U. 511, 15 P.2d 641, the Supreme Court of Utah, in a lengthy
discussion, points out the difference between constables and
county officers and in particular sheriffs.

This case holds that a

constable has no authority in absence of statute to serve process
in a civil action.
No statute of Utah has conferred upon a constable the
authority to conduct a judicial sale.

Rule 69 spells out, without

equivocation, that where the execution "requires the delivery of
possession or sale of real or personal property, it must be issued
to the sheriff of the county where the property or some part
thereof is situated".

{Emphasis ours)

-4-
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It is conceded that Rule 4(m), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended in 1972, confers upon a constable the right
to serve writs and process, but Rule 4 deals solely with process and
the service of the same.

Judicial sales are confined to Rule 69.

Had the Supreme Court in the implementation of its Rules
of Civil Procedure desired to have amended Rule 69, it would have
done so.

In any event, under the holding of Rich v. Industrial

Commission, it is only by statute that a constable derives his
rights and powers, and statutory enactments are accomplished by the
Legislature and not the judicial branch of government.
It need no cituation that the courts are without authority
to legislate.

This is the prerogative of the Legislature and not

of the courts, and therefore the holding of Rich v. Industrial
Commission is still viable as the law of this jurisdiction.
In the instant case, the writ of execution as issued by
the Clerk of the District Court was directed to the Sheriff of Salt
Lake County.

(R 2-14).

The praecipe under which the Sheriff was

to have acted was likewise directed to the Sheriff of Salt Lake
County.

(R 2-22)

At the time of the issuance of this execution,

the time requirements of Rule 69(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
was not inserted into the writ.

The writ shows on its face that it

was issued on February 5, 1974.

However, the purported sale did

not take place until April 10, 1974, more than two months after
its issuance.
Rule 69(c) states:
"When Writ to be Returned. The writ of execution
shall be made returnable at any time within two
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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months after its receipt by the officer.
It
shall be returned to the Clerk from which it issue,
and when it is returned, the Clerk must attach it
to the record."
(Emphasis ours)
The Supreme Court at the time that it adopted Rule 69{c),
used the work "shall" in setting forth when the Writ was returnable.
The word "shall" is usually presumed to be mandatory.
Zeimer, 10 U.2d 45, 347 P.2d 1111.

State v.

In the case of Colman v. Utah

State Land Board (1965), 17 U.2d 14, 403 P.2d 781, 786, the
dissenting opinion of Justice Callister stated:
"The word 'shall' is ordinarily considered as
mandatory and particularly when it is used in a
statute which is addressed to public officials"
(Ci ting cases)
The Sheriff of Salt Lake County is a public official.

See: 17-16-2

UCA 1953.
In 30 Am Jur 2d 482, Executions, §72, it is stated that
an execution not returned within the time prescribed by law is void.
The constable, in making his return, failed to show that
notice of the sale had been properly posted for not less than seven
nor more than fourteen days in conformity with Rule 69(e)

(1)

(2),

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, wherein it is provided:
" (e)

Proceedings on sale of property.
(1) Notice. Before the sale of the property
on execution, notice thereof must be given as
follows:
(2)
In case of other personal property, by
posting a similar notice in at least three
public places of the precinct or city where
the sale is to take place, for not less than
seven nor more than fourteen days."

The constable in his return failed to state that he had complied
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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with this prerequisite.

(R 168)

After submission of the matter to

the Court, the plaintiff caused to be filed with the Court as a
part of his legal memorandum an affidavit dated August 2, 1976, by
the constable alleging that he had in fact complied with the posting requirements.

(R 82)

Neither this affidavit nor the affiant

were susceptible to cross-examination by reason of the fact that
the case had already been submitted to the Court for its deterrnination.

(R 78)

Such affidavit is not admissable as part of the

record and this Court cannot take into consideration such affidavit.
The matter of the return and deficiency of the same, was
brought to the attention of the Court during the-trial and at that
time the plaintiff failed to move for a postponement or continuance
pursuant to Rule 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or for a new
trial claiming surprise pursuant to Rule 60(b).

Under Rule 43, Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, Evidence, it is provided in sub-paragraph
(a) thereof:
"In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall
be taken orally in open Court, unless otherwise
provided by these Rules."
It has long been held that confrontation and cross-examination are
basic ingredients of a fair trial and that it is a valuable right
and it cannot be so constricted as to wholly deprive a party of
the opportunity to test the credibility of a witness.

Crabtree v.

Measday (1973) 85 N.M. 20, 508 P.2d 1317, 1322.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING ITS CASE BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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It needs little authority to substantiate the proposition
of law that a moving party must introduce evidence to prove his
case.
In Keesling v. Basamakis (1975)

~-

U.2d

~~'

539 P.2d

1043, the Supreme Court observed:
"The proponant of a proposition has two
burdens relative to his proof: to produce evidence,
which proves or tends to disprove the proposition
asserted~ and to persuade the trier of fact that
his evidence is more creditable or entitled to the
greater weight."
(Emphasis the Court's)
In the matter now before the Court, plaintiff, at the
time of trial, totally failed and refused to put on any testimony
or introduce any evidence to substantiate its claims as against the
named defendant corporation Universal Distributing Company or the
other named parties, Hugh Gardner or Donald H. Wagstaff, Jr.

In

addition thereto, the plaintiff failed to put on any evidence with
respect to attempting to show the lack of consideration for the
assignment by Universal Diamond Reo Sales & Service to Mr. Gardner
or Mr. Wagstaff.

That was his burden.

In failing so to do, the

Court committed no error in making findings of fact and conclusions
of law that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden.
In Findings of Fact Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, the
Court found as a matter of fact that plaintiff failed to introduce
any evidence or elicit any testimony in substantiation of its
claims with respect to alleged transfers between the defendant
Universal Diamond Reo Sales & Service and Universal Distributing
Company or between defendant Universal Diamond Reo Sales & Service
and the defendants Wagstaff and Gardner, or that there was any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fraud on any creditor or any fraud upon the plaintiff.

These were

the burdens of the plaintiff, and he failed to meet that burden.
Rule 1(1) (5), Utah Rules of Evidence, 1971.
The plaintiff, by the devious method of filing a
memorandum of points and authorities after having rested his case,
attaching thereto affidavits and documents which should have been
preferred at the time of trial, has not complied with the fundamental rules of evidence and fair play, and therefore this Court
should out of hand reject matters not properly part of the record.
POINT III
A CORPORATION MAY ASSIGN ITS ASSETS EVEN THOUGH ITS
CHARTER IS SUSPENDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
In Point IV of plaintiff's brief, he states that the
assignment of certain assets to the defendants Wagstaff and Gardner
was invalid because the corporation had its charter suspended by
the Secretary of State of Utah at the time of the assignment.
Plaintiff cites generalized authority but does not deal
with the fundamental and threshold question of the statutory law
of Utah relative to this matter.
Under 16-10-101 UCA 1953, as amended by the Session Laws
of 1961, it is provided:
"Continuation of corporate existence to wind
up after dissolution. - Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation, either (1) by the issuance
of a certificate of dissolution by the Secretary of
State, or (2) by a decree of court, or (3) by
expiration of its period of duration, the corporate
existence of such corporation shall nevertheless
continue for the purpose of winding up its affairs
in respect to any property and assets which have
-9-
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not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior
to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose such
corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such
property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers."
The Supreme Court of Utah, in Mackay &
Inc. v. Teton Van Gas, Inc.

Knoble Enterprises

(1969} 23 U.2d 200, 460 P.2d 828, points

out that if the corporation which has been dissolved has the right
to sell or otherwise dispose of real and personal property, sue and
be sued, after such dissolution for the purposes of winding up its
affairs, most certainly it has the right to so function while it
is suspended.
It has long been the law of Utah that an insolvent
corporation may prefer one creditor over another.
Passow & Sons v. Wetherbee, 60 U. 243, 167 P. 350;
Weyeth Hardware & Manufacturing Co. v. James Spencer Bateman co.,
15 U. 110, 47 P. 640; Burnham Hannah Munger & Co. v. McCornick,
18 U • 42 t

55 p • 77 •
In the Passow & Sons case, the Supreme Court observed:
"We are therefore of the opinion that the only fair
interpretation which can be placed on the statute
in question is, that where a corporation has, under
its provisions, forfeited its charter, in the winding
up of its affairs and in the disposition of its
assets, it may make preference, by assignment or
otherwise, among its creditors, to the exclusion of
others, so long as not interfered with in a proper
equitable proceeding for the purpose of subjecting
its property and assets to the possession of a
court of equity to be administered upon equally and
impartially among all of its creditors."
It must be noted that under 16-10-101 UCA 1953, as amended

the Legislature did not prescribe a restriction on preference of one
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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creditor over another but granted to the corporation the right to
sell and dispose of all other property.
The plaintiff, in its Point IV, raises the question of
consideration for the assignment to Wagstaff and Gardner.

As

pointed out previously, the plaintiff totally failed to introduce
any evidence whatsoever with respect to the lack of consideration,
although he had the opportunity so to do at the time of trial,
and the court concluded as a matter of law:
"8. The court concludes as a matter of law
that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden to
show that the assignment by the defend~nt Universal
Diamond Reo Sales & Service to the defendants Wagstaff
and Gardner was in fraud of creditors, or of the
plaintiff, or void for want of consideration."
Plaintiff introduced no documentary evidence whatsoever with respect
to the assignment nor the assignment itself.
Plaintiff, in its brief at page 21, under Point V, claims
that the reserves under this assignment was the sole asset of the
corporation.

The plaintiff misstates its case.

This assignment

did not deal at all with the defendant Associates Financial Service
Company's reserves, which remained as assets of Universal Diamond
Reo Sales & Service.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that under the laws of the
State of Utah, a constable derives his authority solely from
statutory enactments by the Legislature.
Under Rule 69, the sole officer authorized to conduct a
judicial sale is the sheriff of the county wherein property is
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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located.

No statutory enactment by the Legislature of this State

has given such authority to a constable.
Industrial

~ornmission

The case of Rich v.

is controlling in this matter.

It is submitted that the plaintiff totally failed to
prove its case by the introduction of evidence ro to elicit testimon
at the time of trial, and therefore cannot now attempt to make a
record on appeal of matters not introduced into evidence nor
elicited from testimony by the use of documents filed with the
court after the matter had been submitted to the court for decision.
It is respectfully submitted that under the laws of the
State of Utah, a suspended corporation or a dissolved corporation
has authority to sell or dispose of its assets, and that it may
prefer one creditor over another.
It is submitted that the plaintiff totally failed to
introduce any evidence or elicit any testimony showing that the
assignment between the defendants Wagstaff and

Gardne~

and the

defendant Universal Diamond Reo Sales & Service was in fraud of
creditors, the plaintiff, or lacked consideration.
It is respectfully submitted that the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment in this matter should be sustained
in their entirety.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL N. COTRO-MANES
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents
Gardner, Universal Diamond Reo and
Universal Distributing Company
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